On 24 February 1525, the French army led by Francis I of Valois, King of France, and the Imperial army commanded by Charles de Lannoy, Viceroy of Naples, clashed in a great battle within the ancient Visconti Park that stretched north of Pavia.
The war between the two most powerful monarchs of Europe began in 1521, after Charles of Habsburg, already King of Spain, had been elected Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation under the name of Charles V, prevailing over his rival Francis I.
Charles V already ruled over Spain, southern Italy, Sicily, and Sardinia; he possessed the Franche-Comté, the Low Countries, and the hereditary Habsburg dominions. The new Emperor also sought to seize Burgundy, which France had annexed in 1477, as well as the Duchy of Milan and the city of Genoa, in order to connect Spain with the Low Countries and complete the encirclement of France. Francis I, in turn, aimed at the Kingdom of Naples and at countering the imperial threat.
The main theatre of war was once again Italy, where France controlled the Duchy of Milan and Spain held the Kingdom of Naples. The war was immediately unfavorable to the French, who lost the Duchy of Milan, where the Spaniards installed Francesco II Sforza, second son of Ludovico il Moro. In the summer of 1524, the Imperial forces invaded Provence and laid siege to Marseille. However, the city put up a tenacious resistance; the King himself came to its aid, and the besiegers were forced to withdraw.
In mid-October 1524, Francis I entered Italy at the head of a powerful army of more than 30,000 men, determined to reconquer Lombardy. The Imperial troops, exhausted by the campaign in Provence, lacked the strength to face the French in open battle. They therefore decided to abandon the indefensible Milan and withdraw beyond the River Adda, leaving a strong garrison inside Pavia. In this way, they hoped to delay the French advance and gain time to rebuild a new army. The defence of the city was entrusted to Antonio de Leyva, a capable and resolute soldier, steadfastly loyal to Charles V, who commanded a strong garrison of about 1,000 Spaniards and 5,000 German Landsknechts.
As the Imperial commanders had hoped, Francis I, instead of pursuing and destroying the remnants of the weary Imperial army as his more prudent officers advised, followed the counsel of his close friend Guillaume Gouffier, Lord of Bonnivet, who believed that Pavia would fall easily. Francis therefore decided to seize the city first, in order to complete, with its conquest, his domination of the Milanese.
Already the capital of the Lombard and Italic Kingdoms, rival of Milan until the mid-fourteenth century, and seat of the illustrious Studium Generale, Pavia was the second city of the Duchy. "This city is situated in such a manner," wrote the Pavia historian Breventano in his History of the Antiquity, Nobility and Remarkable Things of the City of Pavia, "that it offers a delightful and marvelous sight of itself, and has a fairer view than any other city built upon a plain, being surrounded by an even horizon… This site of the city, being somewhat inclined, affords great pleasure to those who behold it, especially to those who find themselves beyond the Ticino… and it presents a most beautiful prospect, owing to the great number of towers, both of private houses and of churches, which… were more than one hundred and sixty in number."
On the right bank of the river, upon an island formed by the Ticino and one of its branches, the Gravellone, there stood the Borgo of Sant’Antonio—today Borgo Ticino—linked to the city by the fourteenth-century Covered Bridge. Yet, though Pavia was very beautiful, it was poorly defended, being surrounded by weak medieval crenellated walls—tall and thin—dating from the late twelfth century, interspersed with towers and ten gates. To make them capable of withstanding the fire of the French artillery, de Leyva had them reinforced with earthen ramparts, ordered the construction of redoubts with loopholes, and arranged internal defensive lines at the most vulnerable points, in case the attackers should succeed in breaching the walls.
On the northern side of these walls stood, as it does today, the Visconti Castle — a magnificent and solid square-shaped structure commissioned by Galeazzo II Visconti in 1360.
The population of the city, struck by the plague that had claimed numerous victims and deserted by many inhabitants who had taken refuge in the countryside or in other towns, numbered at that time around 10.000 souls. To these were added the 6.000 soldiers of the garrison and several thousand civilians, mostly women, who followed them; altogether, we may estimate a total of at least 18.000 mouths to feed.
To the north of the castle, starting from the walls of Pavia and stretching almost as far as the Certosa, extended the great Visconti Park (the Barcho). Its construction had been begun by Galeazzo II Visconti after the conquest of Pavia and completed by his son Gian Galeazzo. The Park, originally intended mainly for hunting, was enclosed by a solid brick wall about 2 and a half metres high and 40 centimetres thick, with a perimeter of 21 kilometres. It was divided into the Old Park and the New Park by a wall running from the Cantone delle Tre Miglia in the west to Due Porte in the east. Almost at the centre of the Old Park stood, as it does today, the Castle of Mirabello — in reality a magnificent fortified hunting lodge protected by a moat. Several small settlements and farmsteads were scattered throughout the Park, among them the Cascina Repentita, situated close to the southern side of the dividing wall between Porta Roveri and the Cantone delle Tre Miglia.
The surface of the Park, undulating and partly covered with woodland, was crossed by numerous streams, the most important of which, the Vernavola, rose — as it still does — in the New Park, then flowed southwards through a deep channel across the entire length of the Old Park before leaving it just outside Pavia, turning east and emptying into the Ticino downstream from the city.
The French army arrived before the walls of Pavia at the end of October.
The most prominent component of Francis I’s army was the heavy noble cavalry — the gendarmerie. The shock infantry was made up of Swiss pikemen and the Landsknechts of the Black Band. There were also numerous companies of French infantry, Italian adventurers, and light horsemen. Altogether, the army numbered about 28.000 men, with an artillery park of around 60 cannons of various types.
The Swiss troops encamped to the east of Pavia, in the area known as the “Five Abbeys,” so called because of the monasteries of San Pietro in Verzolo, San Giacomo, Santo Spirito, San Paolo, and Sant’Apollinare. Francis I and Henry II d’Albret, King of Navarre, lodged in the Abbey of San Lanfranco. The Black Band — the corps of Landsknechts in French pay — was stationed to the west, near the Basilica of San Salvatore (today San Mauro); Italian and French units occupied the right bank of the Ticino to the south; part of the armyencamped inside the Old Park.
In the first days, the French, confident that they would take the city easily, launched a series of assaults, all of which were repelled.
Contrary to Bonnivet’s expectations, the siege dragged on through the winter months, with Pavia showing no sign of surrender. Meanwhile, the defenders’ sorties, the hardships, and the inclemency of the weather — snow, biting winds, and penetrating cold — caused many losses among the besiegers.
In December, Giovanni de’ Medici joined Francis I’s army with 2,500 men of his Bands.
In the meantime, the Imperial forces had assembled a new army with troops arriving from Germany, consisting of about eight hundred heavy cavalry, twelve thousand German Landsknechts, six thousand Spanish infantrymen, three thousand Italians, and fifteen hundred light horsemen. The commander of this army was the Viceroy of Naples, Charles de Lannoy, assisted by Charles III de Bourbon Montpensier, former Constable of France, and by Fernando d’Avalos, Marquis of Pescara.
On 24 January 1525, the Imperial army set out towards Pavia. At the news of their approach, the French moved most of their forces eastwards. A line of field fortifications was built along the course of the Vernavola stream, from the eastern wall of the Park down to the Ticino. The King moved from San Lanfranco first to Mirabello and then, from 6 February, to the convent of San Paolo.
On 4 February, the Imperial army encamped within sight of the eastern wall of the Park.
During the following three weeks, the two armies faced each other in a succession of skirmishes, raids, night incursions, and artillery duels. In one of these engagements Giovanni de’ Medici was wounded. He was carried to Piacenza under a safe-conduct to be treated and could take no further part in the battle.
The passing of time without any decisive action favored the French, who, protected by very strong positions, refused the battle that the Imperial forces continually sought to provoke. The commanders of Charles V, meanwhile, found themselves in a difficult situation due to the scarcity of provisions needed to feed the troops and the lack of money to pay the Landsknechts, who threatened to abandon the army if their overdue wages were not paid soon. Added to this was de Leyva’s urgent request to act quickly, as the situation within Pavia was becoming critical. The Landsknechts, deprived of wine and pay, were on the verge of mutiny, and supplies were beginning to run short.
Faced with the certainty of losing a large part of their army without fighting, or of taking the risks of a pitched battle, the Imperial commanders chose the latter course. Fernando d’Avalos, probably already anticipating the battle, had in the preceding days provoked false alarms in the French camp with feigned attacks, intending to deceive the enemy when the real assault came. During these operations, he had carefully reconnoitred the French positions, their sentry posts and guard shifts, and gathered as much information as possible about the enemy army.
He then devised a plan based on the element of surprise: to enter the Old Park by night and occupy Mirabello, behind the French lines, in order to cut their communications with Milan and thus compel them to fight in the open, under unfavourable conditions. The Marquis of Pescara’s idea was probably to fight a defensive battle, with his army deployed on the right bank of the Vernavola stream, to exploit the firepower of the Spanish arquebusiers, as had been done at Bicocca in 1522. The defenders of the city were to sally out from Pavia and attack the French from the rear when they heard two cannon shots — the agreed signal for the beginning of the assault. The plan was conveyed to de Leyva by a messenger who managed to slip through the enemy lines.
Since the operation was to take place at night, all the soldiers were ordered to wear a white shirt over their clothes, so as to distinguish themselves from the enemy in the darkness.
During the night between 23 and 24 February, the Imperial troops broke camp, set fire to part of their tents, loaded the baggage onto carts, and moved towards Lardirago, in order to make the French believe that they were retreating. The operation was covered by three companies of light infantry who, to distract the enemy’s attention, made noise and fired a few arquebus shots. After marching only a few kilometres, while the baggage convoy continued towards Lardirago, the Imperial army turned left and approached the eastern boundary wall of the Old Park, near Due Porte. Two companies of Spanish infantry were at work opening three breaches in it. The task, longer than expected because of the exceptional strength of the wall, was completed only at daybreak, behind the schedule envisaged by the Marquis of Pescara. Even before the work was finished, his cousin Alfonso d’Avalos, Marquis of Vasto, entered the Park at the head of 3.000 Spanish and German arquebusiers and advanced towards Mirabello.
The French, deceived by the diversionary action of the enemy’s light infantry, were still unaware of what was happening. Believing that the Imperial troops were in retreat, they were preparing to pursue them. The arquebusiers of del Vasto reached Mirabello just as dawn was breaking and surprised the few soldiers stationed there, together with a heterogeneous crowd of non-combatants following the French army. Taken in their sleep, many had no time to flee and were slaughtered by the Imperial soldiers, who plundered everything in sight. (Tapestry 1)
Meanwhile, the main body of the Imperial army — after the agreed two cannon shots had been fired — had also entered the Park and was advancing towards Mirabello. At the head marched the cavalry, followed by the Spanish infantry and the German Landsknechts of Georg von Frundsberg and Marck Sittich von Ems.
An alarm was raised in the French camp. The troops immediately available formed up in battle order, and the field artillery moved into position. The King, together with 800 gendarmes and their retinues — a total of about 2.500 horsemen — took position on the left, towards the Vernavola. The Black Band, 4.000 Landsknechts strong, held the center; on the right, a square of about 3.000 Swiss under the command of the Lord of Florange formed up. In their haste to arm themselves, these Swiss did not have time to take up their arquebuses. Fourteen cannons were placed in the front line. Further back stood the reserve of four hundred gendarmes under the command of the Duke of Alençon, brother-in-law of Francis I, having married his sister Margaret of Angoulême. Another five thousand Swiss were farther away, encamped in the area of the Five Abbeys — so called for the monasteries of San Pietro in Verzolo, San Giacomo, Santo Spirito, San Paolo, and Sant’Apollinare — and were unable to intervene immediately. Most of the remaining French forces stayed in their positions around the city, ready to repel any sorties by the besieged.
As the Imperial army advanced towards Mirabello, the French forces moved northwards to intercept it. The Imperials, realizing that the element of surprise had been only partially achieved, deployed in battle order with the cavalry on the right, the Spanish square in the center, and the two squares of Landsknechts on the left. Meanwhile, the Marquis of Vasto had abandoned his position at Mirabello and, having recrossed the Vernavola, rejoined the main body of the army with his arquebusiers.
Confronted with the enemy’s entire army, Francis I could at that moment deploy no more than ten thousand men, facing a numerical disadvantage of two to one. Remaining in the realm of conjecture, it is also possible that, at the outset, the King had believed the Imperial attack to be merely a rearguard action covering a retreat, and that only later did he realise he was facing the whole of the enemy forces.
The French artillery began to pound the massive Imperial squares. To shield themselves from the cannon fire, the infantrymen lay flat on the ground, seeking shelter in the hollows of the terrain.
In the meantime, Francis I had begun to advance with his gendarmes against the Imperial cavalry, losing all contact with the infantry, which in turn was left without the support of the cavalry. The charge of the royal gendarmerie swept into the line of fire of the French artillery, which was forced to cease firing.
The French cavalry drove back the Imperial horsemen, who retreated in disorder. In the fighting, Ferrante Castriota, Marquis of Civita Sant’Angelo, commander of a unit of light cavalry, was killed by the King of France. The French halted to allow their exhausted horses to recover from the strain of the charge and the combat.
Francis I was radiant. Now certain of victory, he raised the visor of his helmet and, turning to Thomas de Foix, Lord of Lescun, exclaimed the famous words: “Sir, from now on I wish to be called Lord of Milan!”. (Tapestry 2)
Francis I’s exultation, however, was premature, and his initial victory illusory. After the charge, the French knights were isolated, without the support of the infantry. While they were attempting to regroup, Fernando d’Avalos sent about eight hundred Spanish arquebusiers against them. These spread out across the fields, took cover among the vegetation, and from short range poured a deadly hail of lead upon the astonished French gendarmes.
The Spaniards were using new-model arquebuses, longer, heavier, and more powerful than the standard ones, capable of piercing the armor of the knights with ease. For the latter, it was a disaster. Helpless against a highly mobile and well-trained enemy whom they could not reach, unable either to strike back or to defend themselves, the horsemen began to fall, many dragged to the ground by their wounded or slain mounts. The foot soldiers then threw themselves upon the fallen knights and killed them with a shot from their arquebus, thrusting the muzzle into the openings of their armor. The Imperial cavalry, which — not having been pursued — had had time to regroup, now joined the combat.
Meanwhile, the fortunes of battle were also turning in favor of the Imperial side at the center and on the left, where the infantry had re-formed into battle order and advanced to engage the opposing foot soldiers.
The first clash took place between the two great squares of German pikemen — the Landsknechts — and that of the Black Band. The Imperial Landsknechts were supported by a line of Spanish arquebusiers. When the opposing formations faced each other, they knelt to pray before fighting. The first to rise were about two hundred arquebusiers of the Black Band, who stepped ten paces forward from their square and opened fire, but without causing losses; armed with old-style arquebuses, lacking a mechanical firing mechanism, they could not aim carefully, having to hold the weapon with the left hand while with the right they ignited the priming powder by means of a match wrapped around a stick.
The Spaniards, equipped with more recent models of arquebuses — with button, lever, or trigger mechanisms — which allowed them to hold the weapon with both hands and aim, rose in turn and opened a sustained and organized fire that tore wide gaps in the enemy ranks.
The Marquis of Pescara decided to take part in the fighting himself, mounted on a great warhorse called Mantovano, a gift from the Marquis of Mantua. After a fierce and desperate struggle, the Black Band, outnumbered by nearly three to one, was annihilated. Almost all of its members fell in the melee, including its commanders, Richard de la Pole, former Duke of Suffolk, and Francis of Lorraine. (Tapestry 3)
The Spaniards in turn confronted the Swiss of Florange. Already shaken by the fate that had befallen the Black Bandand struck by a heavy fire of arquebuses, the Swiss lost heart and broke ranks.
While his army was being annihilated, Francis I continued to fight with desperate courage. At last, realizing that any further resistance was useless, he sought to escape in order to save his life or avoid capture. He made his way towards the dividing wall of the Park, probably in search of an exit towards Milan, which was still held by the French. When he reached the vicinity of the Cascina Repentita, a shot from an arquebus brought down his horse, and he was dragged to the ground, his left leg trapped beneath his dying steed. Three Spanish horsemen — Diego de Ávila, Juan de Urbieta, and Alonso Pita da Veiga — fell upon him and took him prisoner. Shortly afterwards, Charles de Lannoy arrived and received the formal surrender of the King of France. (Tapestry 4)
As for the Duke of Alençon, judging the day to be irretrievably lost, instead of coming to the aid of Francis I, he deemed it wiser to withdraw with his horsemen towards the south. He crossed the Ticino by the pontoon bridge that the French had built downstream from Pavia during the siege.
The course of the battle had thus been completely reversed. The victory that Francis I had considered certain only a short time before had turned into a disastrous defeat. Once the fate of the Black Band and of the Swiss square of Florange had been sealed, the second Swiss square, about five thousand men strong, was also overcome. Coming from their camp east of Pavia, these Swiss were attacked from the rear by the troops of Antonio de Leyva, who, having left the Visconti Castle, had broken through the resistance of Giovanni de’ Medici’s bands, and confronted head-on by the Imperial troops advancing victoriously from the north. Shaken and uncertain, seeing that all hope was lost, the Swiss refused to fight, threw down their weapons, and sought safety in flight, heading south towards the Ticino, hoping to cross it by the pontoon bridge already used by Alençon. (Tapestry 5)
The latter, however, after securing his own safety, had ordered the bridge destroyed. Together with him, a few thousand Italian soldiers and some Frenchmen — those who had managed to cross the river in time or who were already on the right bank of the Ticino — succeeded in escaping. (Tapestry 6)
Not knowing where to flee, many of the Swiss were cut down by the pursuers; others, in despair, sought to escape the Spanish steel by throwing themselves into the icy waters of the Ticino, where many, unable to swim, drowned, swept away by the strong current. (Tapestry 7)
The battle ended with the inevitable and much-desired plundering of the French camp by the Imperial soldiers and by the civilians who followed them. (Tapestry 5)
The battle, which had lasted less than two hours, ended in an Imperial triumph of extraordinary proportions. Beyond the capture of the King — a sensational event in itself, and in any case decisive not only for the outcome of the battle but also for that of the war — the victory was completed by the total rout of the French army, which lost between eight and ten thousand men, dead or wounded.
Among the dead were Guillaume Gouffier, Lord of Bonnivet; Jacques de Chabannes, Lord of La Palice; Louis II de La Trémoille; Galeazzo Sanseverino, Grand Écuyer of France; and many other knights. The prisoners numbered in the thousands. Among them, besides the King of France, were Henry II d’Albret, King of Navarre, and many other prominent figures.
The Imperial losses amounted to about five hundred men.
After his capture, Francis I was taken prisoner to the convent of San Paolo. Two days later, he was transferred to Pizzighettone and from there to Spain.
Among the illustrious captives, some later paid large sums of money to ransom themselves. Others, like Henry of Navarre, managed to escape. The poorer knights, who lacked the means to pay their ransom, and the ordinary soldiers were disarmed and released to return home. Few of these ever made it back — especially the Swiss, who were largely attacked and slaughtered by peasants along the way.
The bodies of the dead met with different destinies. On the following day, the corpses of the most important knights were collected by the Spaniards and the Germans and taken to the monastery of San Paolo. Here they were eviscerated, sprinkled with aloe and other oils, and filled with aromatic herbs to delay putrefaction, so that they could be transported to France after agreeing on the ransom price with the secretaries accompanying them. The two most illustrious commanders of the Black Band, Richard de la Pole and Francis of Lorraine, were buried in the church of San Pietro in Ciel d’Oro. Their tombs have disappeared.
Of the multitude of “common” dead, little is known. Francesco Taegio, chronicler of the siege and the battle, reports that the corpses of the slain were scattered over two miles around Pavia. As the days passed, fearing epidemics, arrangements were made for their burial, probably in mass graves. About a month and a half after the battle, a hundred bodies carried by the waters of the Ticino and then the Po were cast upon the beaches of Malamocco, in the Venetian lagoon.
The Battle of Pavia brought the war to an end only momentarily. In January 1526, Francis I, in exchange for his freedom, was forced to accept the Treaty of Madrid, by which he was to cede the Duchy of Milan, Burgundy, and other territories, and renounce all claims to the Kingdom of Naples. Upon his return to France in March, Francis I refused to ratify the agreements of Madrid, arguing that they had been imposed while he was in captivity. On 22 May 1526, France concluded the League of Cognac with the Papacy, Venice, Florence, and Milan — the Italian states alarmed by the growing Imperial power.
The war resumed; other battles were fought, Italy was again crossed by foreign armies, and both Rome and Pavia were devastated and plundered. Yet the general strategic situation defined by the Battle of Pavia did not change. On August 5, 1529, France and Spain signed the Peace of Cambrai. Francis I ceded the Duchy of Milan to Charles V, renounced his claims to the Kingdom of Naples, but retained Burgundy.
With the Peace of Cambrai in 1529, France was expelled from Italy, which remained under Spanish control.
In November 1529, Charles V met with Pope Clement VII in Bologna. The emperor, absolute arbiter of the Italian political situation, imposed his power and his will by stipulating a perpetual alliance between the Empire, the Church, and the Italian states. On 22 February he was crowned by Pope Clement VII King of Italy, and two days later — on 24 February, the fifth anniversary of the victory at Pavia — Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation.
At the end of 1535, upon the death of Francesco II Sforza, who had ruled by the Emperor’s concession and under a kind of Spanish protectorate, the Duchy of Milan passed into the hands of Charles V, who later gave it to his son Philip of Habsburg, the future King of Spain.
Spanish domination over Lombardy lasted until the beginning of the eighteenth century, when it was replaced by Austrian rule.
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